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CRIME INCORPORATED
The problem of corporate criminal liability is one of comparatively
recent origin. Originally at common law, both in America and in England,
corporations could not be criminally liable.' There were several basic reasons
for this. First, corporations as a form of business association had not
approached the magnitude and significance which they reached during the
succeeding three centuries, 2 most corporations of any note being little more
than quasi-governmental organizations utilized by England in the ad-
ministration and expansion of her colonial empire.s Injuries from associations
of this type were to an extent sanctioned by or connected with the govern-
ment and, in any event, were committed against native or colonial popula-
tions whose grievances would be given little weight in Whitehall.
In addition, there were some strong theoretical barriers to imposing
criminal penalties on a corporation. Under the common law, mens rea
was considered to be an essential element in the definition of any crime
and had to be alleged and proved before a conviction could be had. This
is of course still true today, with the exception of statutes imposing absolute
liability for the commission of certain acts. Since a corporation, an artificial
person, could not itself form or harbor the necessary evil intent or mens
rea for the commission of a crime, 4 a corporation could not be found guilty.
The guilty party, if any, would have to be a person purporting to act for
the corporation. This logic was buttressed by the now nearly defunct
doctrine of ultra vires. A corporation was chartered for a specific purpose
and this purpose was set forth in the corporate charter. Thus, a corporation
organized for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad could
not legally do any act unconnected with this functions Naturally, no corpo-
ration was ever, at least officially, organized for the purpose of committing
crimes and therefore, a corporation was incapable of engaging in criminal
conduct. If a crime was committed by officers or agents of a corporation,
even though done in its behalf the agents and not the corporation had to
be the culpable parties since a crime was beyond the legal capacity of the
corporate entity.°
1 Anonymous, 12 Mod. Rep. 559 (K.B. 1701); 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 476,
477 (1765); State v. Great Works Mill & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41 (1841); State v.
General Fire Extinguisher Co., 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 438 (Super. Ct. 1910).
2 Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 Harv. L.
Rev. 105 (1888).
3 Id. E.g., the East Indian Company which governed India until the middle of
the nineteenth century.
4 Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (1854); State
v. Morris R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852).
5 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1904); Sanderson v. White, 34 Mass. (18
Pick.) 328 (1836).
6 Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, supra note 4; State v. Morris R.R.,
supra note 4. The law of torts did not get entangled in the cobwebs of the ultra vires
doctrine.
If a subordinate agent or servant of a corporation engages in an ultra vires
transaction without any authority from the managing officers, and commits a
tort, the corporation is not liable because his act is not within the scope of
739
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The history of the commercial and industrial revolutions and the con-
current utilization of joint stock companies with limited liability is too well
known to repeat here These economic developments were, of course, coupled
with a gradual democratization and consequent growing social responsiveness
of courts and governments, and this led, naturally enough, to a re-evaluation
of the original notions of corporate criminal immunity. Society was now
faced with the modern corporate leviathan with its vastly diffused ownership
and multiplicity of functions. Criminal conduct was emanating from some
of these leviathans regardless of who might be theoretically culpable, and
the problem became too compelling for courts and legislatures to ignore.
The problem, however, was dealt with on an ad hoc basis, whenever and
wherever a situation arose which demanded attention, with little compre-
hensive evaluation of the entire area.?
The first leading case in the United States concerning the imposition
of criminal sanctions upon a corporation was the 1909 Supreme Court de-
cision in New York Cent. & H. R.R. v. United States. 8 The case arose
under the Elkins Act,° which makes it a misdemeanor for any carrier to
knowingly pay or receive a rebate and which further provides that the act
of an agent within the scope of his employment shall be deemed to be
the act of the carrier. The agent in this case was a shipping clerk. Although
discussed in the context of the statute, the Court stated that there was no
real reason why a corporation should be held immune from criminal
liability. Both the decision and the statute were justified on the ground
that since a corporation can act only through its agents the conduct of the
latter can, and for effective law enforcement, must, be imputed to the
former.1°
This line of thinking quickly took root in both state" and federal
courts." Courts tended to place less and less emphasis on the position of
the transgressing agent in the corporate hierarchy and to find the corporation
guilty if the agent was acting within the scope of his employment when he
violated the law." One of the few jurisdictions which tended to modify the
his employment, and not because it is beyond restrictions imposed on the
business by the charter. A very different case is presented when the directors
or managing officers, authorize or engage in an ultra vires business. In such
a case the buiiness becomes that of the corporation, though unauthorized
by its charter, and for torts committed in the course of such business it is
liable.
Ballantine, Corporations 273 (1946).
7 Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 22 (1957).
212 U.S. 481 (1908).
9 Elkins Act, 34 Stat. 588 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 41(2) (1958).
to Supra note 8.
it Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N.E.2d 210 (1944).
Joseph L. Sigretto & Sons v. State, 127 N.J.L. 578 (1942); State v. Western Union
Tel. Co., N.J. Super. 172, 221 (1951).
12 Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945); Egan v.
United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943); United
States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. III. 1946), aff'd, 173
F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949); United States v. Wilson, 59 F.2d 97 (W.D. Wash. 1932).
is United States v. Steiner Plastics Co., 231 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956); St. Johnsbury
Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v. George
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absoluteness of this line of cases was New York, although to what extent
is by no means clear. The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Canadian
Fur Trappers Corp.," reversed a conviction on the grounds that "the
mere . . . intent of the agent to steal would not be sufficient in and of
itself . . . the evidence must go further than in the cases involving solely
the violation of prohibitive statutes. The intent must be the intent of the
corporation and not merely that of the agent." 15 A subsequent case extended
liability to situations where:
(1) the corporation has benefited or profited from the crime; or
(2) its officers participated in the crime; or (3) its officers au-
thorized, sanctioned or acquiesced in the commission of 'the crime
by an agent or employee; or (4) it had knowledge of the crime;
or (5) it was chargeable with negligence in not obtaining such
knowledge through reasonable inquiry."
However the court pointed out that something more than the mere fact
of the agency must be shown to support a conviction." Some form of
corporate complicity is thus demanded.
F. Fisk Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946); C. I. T. Corp.
V. United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945); 'Egan v. United States, supra note 12.
14 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455 (1928).
15 Id. at 160, 161 N.E. at 456.
IS People v. Raphael, 190 Misc. 582, 72 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1947).
17 Supra note 8. But to establish the criminal intent of a corporation, courts have
increasingly relied on a determination of whether the agent is performing his assigned
duties. In Continental Baking Company, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir. 1960) the court
said, "that as long as the criminal act is directly related to the performance of the
duties which the officer or agent has the broad authority to perform, the corporate
principal is liable for the criminal act also, and must be deeemd to have 'authorized'
the criminal act." The court, in United States v, Steiner Plastics Mfg. Co., supra
note 13, at 153, held it sufficient "to show that the agents of the corporation acting
within the area entrusted to them had violated the law." However, the borrowing of
the doctrine of respondeat superior has not allowed a satisfactory standard to develop
from which to impute criminal liability to the corporations from the act of agents
because, inherent in the doctrine is the preclusion of a corporate defense except on
grounds of lack of agency. Thus in Old Monastery Co. v. United States, supra note 12,
the court summarily rejected the corporate defense that the acts of its president in
selling liquor at prices in excess of wartime ceilings not only had not benefited the
corporation, but actually had worked a detriment to it. The corporation was found
guilty on the grounds that, in selling the liquor, its president was performing his
corporate functions. The court stated, "we do not accept benefit as a touchstone of
criminal liability; benefit, at best, is an evidential, not an operative fact." The
dilemma was more forcefully brought to the fore in Standard Oil v. United States,
307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962), where three corporate employees and their respective
corporations were indicted for violations of the Connally Hot Oil Act, 49 Stat. 30
(1935), 15 U.S.C. l 715 (1958). There, C. J. Thompson Inc., an owner of a number
of oil wells, had induced the employees of Pasotex Corporation, an oil pumping station,
to falsify the records and credit the amount of crude oil pumped from.various Thompson
wells which overproduced, to Thompson wells which were under-producing. The Pasotex
employees were also induced, with Standard Oil employees consenting, to credit
Thompson's less productive wells with oil drawn from Standard Oil wells. The trial
court rejected an argument that the employees were not operating within the scope
of their employment and all three corporations were convicted. Although the court
of appeals reversed as to Pasotex and Standard by holding that a corporation is not
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This line of judicial reasoning, as has been noted, stands as an ex-
ception to the respondeat superior theory enunciated in New York Central.
The first question to be considered then, is whether respondeat superior
can be theoretically transplanted from the field of torts to the field of
crimes. In the case of a principal other than a corporation, there is no
question that any such imposition of liability would violate the federal
constitution' 8
 as well as our generally accepted principles of natural justice.
No human master could be held to answer for the crimes of his servant
unless he were in some way implicated in their commission. There is,
however, no such constitutional impediment to the conviction of
corporations.'° Respondeat superior may at least legally be applied. The
problem is, however, whether the doctrine and its justification have any
relation to the criminal law and its underlying theories. The most widely
accepted justification of the doctrine is known as the "Entrepreneur
Theory."2° Professor Mechem states it as follows:
Every industry, it is suggested, takes a regular and more or less
predictable annual toll, both in property and in flesh and blood.
If, e.g., the records of the Shantytown & Southern Railroad were
examined and subjected to a statistical computation, it could be
predicted with considerable accuracy how many people would be
killed and maimed in the coming year, how many cars wrecked,
and the like. Restaurants doubtless have an accounting item
named "breakage"; this is breakage, too, if on a bigger and more
distressing scale. On whom should the replacement cost fall? Un-
like the restaurant, the railroad can get new victims without cost;
to do so, however, leaves a tragic list of innocent and uncom-
pensated victims. Why not treat it as a cost of business, as the
restaurant does? If the railroad pays, it will easily be able to spread
the cost by raising its charges The expense then ultimately rests,
like other expenses of running a railroad, on that part of the public
which needs, patronizes, and presumably profits by the existence of,
a railroad. The cost to each individual member of the railroad-
interested public, is, per accident, insignificant; if left to rest on
the victim of the particular accident it may be ruinous. 21
The doctrine, therefore, represents an allocation of loss consistent with the
public interest in allowing these enterprises to exist. It does not, at least
according to the above rationale, have as a direct objective the sanctioning
of behavior. This is demonstrated by the fact that according to the federal
and majority view, a corporation cannot be held for exemplary or punitive
damages for the torts of its employees unless some degree of complicity is
guilty of criminal conduct of employees, who, although ostensibly acting within the
scope of their employment, are acting with no intent to benefit their employer, the court
did not establish any clearer guidelines for future lower court decisions.
18
 New York Cent. & H. R.R. v. United States, supra note 8.
10 Ibid.
20 Mechem, Outlines of the Laws of Agency § 360, at 243 (4th ed. 1952).
21
 Ibid. For a slightly different statement of this theory, and comment on it
see Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 III. L. Rev. 339 (1935).
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show on the part of the corporate executives. 22 The purpose of the criminal
law, on the other hand, is to define socially intolerable conduct, and to hold
all conduct within limits which are reasonably acceptable from the social
point of view,28 that is, criminal law is theoretically designed to deter
certain behavior which society finds undesirable. Punishment is not the
purpose of the criminal law, since, if it were entirely successful, there would
be no one to punish. We thus have this dichotomy which arises when we
consider the approach of the law to the torts of a corporate agent and the
approach to his crimes. The theoretical justifications of respondeat su-
perior which are quite valid in the field of torts do not admit of ready
application to crimes. In addition, while both the majority of state juris-
dictions and the federal courts will not apply punitive damages to a
corporation for the tort of its agent, they will apply criminal liability for
the agent's crime.
This is striking when one considers that punitive damages are designed,
at least in part, to prevent commission of the tort, and not to compensate.
There would seem to be a public policy to the effect that, although the
party injured by an intentional tort committed by a corporate agent should
be compensated for his injury, the imposition of exemplary damages would
serve no useful purpose. The only apparent basis of such a public policy
would be that the imposition of such damages would be futile and would
not prevent such torts in the future. If this is correct, then the imposition
of criminal liability is incorrect, unless criminal opprobrium will serve as
an effective deterrent while mere money damages will not. There is, of
course, the possibility that corporate criminal liability may rest on some
form of social "vengeance" against the corporate entity for harboring
criminal elements within it. However it would be totally inimical to our
theories of jurisprudence for such a theory to form the basis of liability.
The theoretical conflicts and the lack of a dearly enunciated policy
in this area are apparent. The Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute has as an objective the formulation of logical and practical solutions
to the criminal problems which face society. Let us examine its provisions
on corporate criminal liability. Basically the Code subjects corporations to
criminal liability for all offenses within the ambit of section 1.04. 24 This
22 Ballantine, supra note 6, § 110 at 270. See also Pelton v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 139 Ore. 198, 7 P.2d 263 (1932). Lake Shore and M.S. Ry. Co. v.
Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1892) (explaining and distinguishing Denver and R.G. Ry. Co.
v. Harris, 122 U.S. 625 (1866); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 12 F.2d 818, 821
(C.A.D.C. 1926). But where the responsible officers of a corporation commit a tort
while acting for the corporation, with wantonness or malice, or where they authorize
or ratify such a tort by a subordinate employee, or where they employ or retain
a subordinate, knowing that he is dishonest or malicious, and he commits a tort because
of his dishonest or malicious nature, then his fraud or malice is attributable to the
corporation. Lake Shore and M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, supra; Memphis Press-Scimitar
Co. v. Chapman, 62 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1933) ; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. White, 104
F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1939); Lowe v. Yolo County Consol. Water Co., 157 Cal. 503,
108 Pac. 297 (1910); Cleghorn v. New York Cent. & H. River RR., 56 N.Y. 44
(1874).
23 Perkins, Criminal Law 4 (1957).
24 Model Penal Code § 1.04 (1962). CLASSES OF CRIMES; VIOLATIONS.
(1) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State,
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section grades offenses according to the penalty which attaches to a given
act. The grades are felony, misdemeanor, petty misdemeanor, and violation.
The first three are punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine and the fourth
by fine only. Section 2.07 of the Code 25 deals with corporate liability di-
for which a sentence of [death or of] imprisonment is authorized, constitutes
a crime. Crimes are classified as felonies, misdemeanors or petty misdemeanors.
(2) A crime is a felony if it is so designated in this Code or if persons
convicted thereof may be sentenced [to death or] to imprisonment for a term
which, apart from an extended term, is in excess of one year.
(3) A crime is a misdemeanor if it is so designated in this Code or in
a statute other than this Code enacted subsequent thereto.
(4) A crime is a petty misdemeanor if it is so designated in this Code or
in a statute other than this Code enacted subsequent thereto or if it is defined
by statute other than this Code which now provides that persons convicted
thereof may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term, of which the maximum
is less . than one year.
(5) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State
constitutes a violation if it is so designated in this Code or in the law defining
the offense or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other
civil penalty is authorized upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other
than this Code which now provides that the offense shall not constitute a
crime. A violation does not constitute a crime and conviction of a violation
shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction
of a criminal offense.
(6) Any offense declared by law to constitute a crime, without specifications
of the grade thereof or of the sentence authorized upon conviction, is a mis-
demeanor.
(7) An offense defined by any statute of this State other than this Code
shall be classified as provided in this Section and the sentence that may be
imposed upon conviction thereof shall hereafter be governed by this Code.
25 Model Penal Code II 2.07 (1962). LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, UNIN-
CORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND PERSONS ACTING, OR UNDER A DUTY
TO ACT, IN THEIR BEHALF.
(1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(a) the offense is a violation or the offense is defined by a statute
other than the Code in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on cor-
porations plainly appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the
corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office
or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents
for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under
which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; or
(b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty
of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(c) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, com-
manded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a
high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of
his office or employment.
(2) When absolute liability is imposed for the commission of an offense,
a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation shall be assumed,
unless the contrary plainly appears.
(3) An unincoroprated association may be convicted for the commission of
an offense if:
(a) the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code which ex-
pressly provides for the liability of such an association and the conduct is per-
formed by an agent of the association acting in behalf of the association
within the scope of his office or employment, except that if the law defining
the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the association is account-
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rectly. A corporation may be convicted if the offense falls within the defi-
nition of violation or is designated as such by the statute defining the crime."
Corporations may also be convicted in situations where a clearly defined
legislative purpose imposes liability on corporations and the act is performed
by an agent within the scope of his employment for the benefit of the
corporation." In addition, breaches of affirmative duties imposed by law
on corporations are punishable, as well as all crimes which are sanctioned
or committed by high corporate authority." Offenses involving absolute
liability, of course, are applicable to corporations as well as individuals."
According to its draftsmen, the Model Penal Code attempts "no revo-
lutionary change in the existing law of the subject" of corporate criminal
liability." In their comments to the section they state that paragraph (a)
is designed to avoid repealing pro tanto existing provisions of law which
legislatures apparently felt to be a necessary complement to various regula-
able or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall
apply; or
(b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty
of affirmative performance imposed on associations by law.
(4) As used in this Section:
(a) "corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a
governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program;
(b) "agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other
person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or association, in the
case of an unincorporated association, a member of such association;
(c) "high managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or an
unincorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any
other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such responsibility
that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corpora-
tion or association.
(5) In any prosecution of a corporation or an unincorporated association
for the commission of an offense included within the terms of Subsection (1)(a)
or Subsection (3)(a) of this Section other than an offense for which absolute
liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by
a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory
responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence
to prevent its commission. This paragraph shall apply if it is not plainly in-
consistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.
(6) (a) A person is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or
causes to be performed in the name of the corporation or an unincorporated
association or in its behalf to the same extent as if it were performed in
his own name or behalf.
(b) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation
or an unincorporated association, any agent of the corporation or association
having primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is legally account-
able for a reckless omission to perform the required act to the same extent
as if the duty were imposed by law directly upon himself.
(c) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of his legal
accountability for the conduct of a corporation or an unincorporated association,
he is subject to the sentence authorized by law when a natural person is con-
victed of an offense of the grade and the degree involved.
26 Model Penal Code f 1.04 (1962).
27 Model Penal Code 2.07 (1962).
28 Model Penal Code 11 2.07(4)(c) (1962).
29 Model Penal Code 2.07(2) (1962).
88 American Law Institute, 33rd Annual Meeting, Proceedings 127 (1956).
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tory policies?' Paragraphs (a) and (c) construed together are drafted to
provide a more restricted basis of liability than has hitherto been present
under the respondeat superior doctrine. 32 In short, under the final draft of the
Code many acts of an agent would no longer be imputed to the principal-
corporation. For example, under the Code a corporation could not be con-
victed of receiving stolen property merely on the basis that an agent com-
mitted the crime in the scope of his employment. For corporate liability, the
Code would either have to be amended so as to make the offense specifically
applicable to corporations or the board of directors or some high corporate
official would have to actually commit or sanction the crime. The reasoning
of the commentators to the Code which justifies liability in the case of
participation by management in the crime is that such participation makes
it "reasonable to assume that their acts are in some substantial sense re-
flective of the policy of the corporate body."33 Liability, they state, should
be restricted in cases where corporate fines are of dubious value, but pre-
served in those instances where stockholders are most likely, to be in a posi-
tion to bring pressure to bear on the management to prevent criminal con-
ducts' This rationale is reflected in the clause of paragraph (c) which permits
liability in cases where the offense was "recklessly tolerated" by management,
thus suggesting an affirmative duty to exercise some sort of care to prevent
the commission of crimes by employees.ss
Sections 6.03" and 6.0487 deal with the penalties which may be meted
out to a corporation. In addition to the fines which may be imposed under
section 6.03, section 6.04 authorizes the revocation of the corporate charter
in situations where the corporate management was implicated in the com-
mission of the offense and such revocation is felt to be in the public interests'
The commentators state that they wish to use the "quo warranto"
remedy as a complement to the use of fines as corporate punishment's' Ac-
cording to the drafters," the section merely codifies and clarifies much of
the existing case and statutory law on the subject.
. The Code therefore retains the idea that a fine should be levied against
a corporation, and assumes that this is a means of controlling corporate be-
havior. There are several questions which must be considered in connection
with both the imposition of liability generally and the imposition of either
fines or dissolution of a corporate entity. The questions are whether the
proper party is being punished in this form of proceeding and whether the
remedies which have found their way into the law and apparently gained such
31 Model Penal Code, Comments 147 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
32 Supra note 31, at 147-151.
33 Supra note 31, at 151.
34 Supra note 31, at 151.
35 Model Penal Code § 2.07(5) (1962). This section reinforces this position by
raising an affirmative defense in those cases where the corporation can establish by
a "preponderance of the evidence" that the high managerial agent exercised due diligence
to prevent the crime.
36 Model Penal Code § 6.03 (1962).
n Model Penal Code § 6.04 (1962).
38 Model Penal Code §§ 6.03, 6.04 (1962).
39 Model Penal Code, Comments 202 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1956).
46 Ibid.
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acceptance as to be included in what is termed a "Model Penal Code" are,
in fact, effective to deter the behavior in question.
The first problem, of course, is to determine on whom the penalties im-
posed will fall. A fine, all other things being equal, would presumably fall
on the stockholders. 41 If the fine is light in comparison to the size and profit-
ability of the corporation, then its effect would probably be limited to a
reduction in dividends. 42 If larger than the net profit for the fiscal year, then
presumably it would entail a reduction in the stockholders equity in the
corporation since the company would have to either sell assets or secure a
loan in order to pay it. In either event, the basic situation would place the
fine on the shareholders 9 3 Although this would apparently be the ideal situa-
tion and the one contemplated by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, 44 it
is not necessarily the consequence which would occur. The fine could, under
given circumstances, be shifted either forward or backward—that is passed off
to someone in the economic process other than the offending corporation.
This ability to shift, of course, would depend on the nature of the corpora-
tion, its line of commerce and number of competitors, and the degree of
competition, if any, among them. The simplest example of shifting was stated
before the 1956 annual meeting of the American Law Institute by the English
scholar, Professor Williams. He used two examples:
41 In discussing the dangers inherent in allowing punitive damages against cor-
porations, because it can be carried to a "ruinous extreme," Ballantine states,
But such penalties are deemed by many courts only a reasonable means of
regulating the management of the business. Similar questioi•s arise as to the
criminal liability of corporations, and the uncertain rules as to punitive damages
are frequently invoked in support of the infliction of vicarious criminal penalties.
This overlooks the different basis of liability in criminal and tort cases.
Exemplary damages may be regarded as a more liberal compensation, allowed
in view of the aggravated and culpable nature of the wrong rather than as
punishment.
Ballantine, supra note 6, at 272.
42 Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, 164 Fed. 376 (7th Cir. 1908),
same case, 155 Fed. 305 (7th Cir. 1907). The fine of over 29 million dollars, the maxi-
mum possible penalty was imposed. The judgment was reversed partly on the ground
that such a penalty was excessive and an abuse of discretion. "Such a penalty might
fall not only on the shareholders, but on the creditors by wiping out the assets to which
its creditors or victims might look." Ballantine, supra note 6, at 281.
43 United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
666 (1933). Judge Learned Hand stated in this case involving perpetration of a
corporate fraud upon the public by the use of the mails,
The company protests against the fine levied against it. It argues that this
merely takes from the victims of the fraud, assuming that there was a fraud,
part of the little that was left them. We agree. Why it should promote
observance of the law to put into the public treasury money of which innocent
persons have been robbed, is not apparent. But it is a matter with which we
have nothing to do; the company was a juristic person to which, by a fiction,.
criminal responsibility is imputed. It could commit a crime and be punished
in the only way it could be made to suffer. Where the burden falls, the trial
judge must consider; we have no power to change his decision. So far as our
opinion may be thought of consequence in other cases, we may, however, say
that when the company is insolvent, as it always is, we can see no good reason
for more than nominal punishment.
60 F.2d at 690.
44 Model Penal Code, Comments 151 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
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This corporate liability has been applied to public corporations,
so that when an officer of the railway executive was guilty of
of cruelty to sheep, a stiff fine was imposed on the railroad execu-
tive, which presumably may mean that passenger fares tend to go
up in order to meet the fine.
And when the Yorkshire Electric Board was found guilty of
some technical breath of regulation, the Chief Justice imposed a
fine I think of £20,000 or $60,000 on the Yorkshire Electric Board,
which I suppose means that electric rates go up in Yorkshire more
than in other parts of the country.45
These examples involved public monopolistic corporations in which, assum-
ing the sanction of the regulatory authority, any increased cost, including a
fine, may be passed forward to the consumer. Naturally in a highly competi-
tive business such as the retail food market, a merchant could not readily raise
his prices above those of his competitors. The ease of forward shifting would
then depend to some extent, on the degree of competition with which the
offending corporation is faced as well as the extent to which fines of this
nature are imposed upon his competitors. If they are levied with some regu-
larity among all members of a particular industry, they may be treated as
a cost with consequent increase in price of the industry's product." The
facility with which this may be done ultimately depends on the degree of
competition. Under perfect competition (assuming all the firms in the relevant
line of commerce receive approximately the same number of fines each year)
the fine cannot theoretically be shifted forward because no firm will have any
control over the market price of its product—this is determined by the
economic factors of supply and demand. 47 A good example of this would be
trucking firms who regularly incur fines for overloading and treat them as
an ordinary cost of doing business.48 In pure competition, however, the price
which a trucking firm could get for hauling a load a given number of miles
would not depend on what he wished to charge but upon what he could get
from his customer, which, in turn, would be dependent on a complex net of
economic factors such as the need to have goods moved, the state of the
economy, the location of various consumer and other materials, etc. An at-
tempt to shift forward would simply raise his price above that which the
market was willing to pay and deprive him of his customers." The same
45 Mueller, supra note 7, at 27.
40 If a fine is applied to a number of firms which together constitute a monopolistic
economic market—as can occur in a violation of price fixing—since the fine is generally
fixed by degree of participation, which in turn is usually tied to production output
or gross sales,, the fine can be shifted. 50 Geo. L.J. 566, 577 (1962).
47 Poole, Public Finance and Economic Welfare 124-26 (1956).
45 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) ; Poole, op. cit.
supra note 47, at 122-27.
49 Poole, op. cit. supra note 47, at 141-43. The effects may vary significantly among
different countries. Thus in France business firms appear to be especially prone to
mark up all additions to cost without worrying much about reactions in sales volume.
In the more aggressive business relations which characterize American industry, the
uncertainties of oligopoly seem to favor more complex pricing policies. Eastman, The
Economic Effects of French Minimum Wage Law, Am. Econ. Rev. 369-76 (June 1954).
748
STUDENT COMMENTS
would be true of backward shifting under these conditions. Backward shift-
ing occurs when the firm is able to reduce its costs by the amount of the fine
or other added cost, by paying less for labor, materials, plant costs or some
other product or service used by the firm. In a state of pure competition,
an attempt to shift the fines backward to labor might be successful provid-
ing the relevant labor market is not mobile and unionization is not an im-
portant factor." The interplay of a free market would tend to hinder the
backward shifting to the sources of goods used in the industry."
In cases, however, where there is a state of pure competition and the
fine is not levied generally throughout a given line of commerce but is
merely laid upon one firm within that line, shifting becomes impossible. The
only possible haven for solace would be labor and this could occur only
where the labor force is poorly organized and unable for some reason to move
between firms within or out of the industry.52 One example of such a situa-
tion would be the one company town where it would be inconvenient for an
individual worker to move to another location for a slight increase in wages.
In cases of monopolistic or oligopolistic competition the outlook for
shifting is somewhat brighter, since demand for the product usually remains
steady." Product differentiation gives each producer a degree of control
over price." Prices, however, are usually maximized to yield the greatest
overall profit at a given rate of production 5 6 The demand for the product
is usually steady. Treating the fine as an additional cost factor, a fined firm
might merely restrict output and raise prices, 50 and still be able, in conse-
quence of its somewhat monopolistic situation,- to continue to maximize
profits.57
 In the case of a fine levied for price fixing, however, all the given
members of a particular line of commerce are likely to be fined at the same
time and in approximately the same amount. This facilitates forward shift-
ing of the fine, particularly in cases where price leadership of one kind or
another prevails in the field." Although it seems incongruous and somewhat
discouraging to postulate that a fine levied for price fixing will be passed to
the consumer by a more sophisticated continuation of the price fixing, this
appears to be the economic result."
In the cases where the fine cannot be shifted, its burden must fall on
the stockholders. This, in fact, seems to be the expected and desired re-
sult, the theory being that the shareholders will excercise due diligence to
prevent malfeasance by the management if a loss of dividends is their only
alternative." Of course, this assumes that the shareholders are capable of
50 Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations 528-29 (2d ed. 1958).
51 Poole, op. cit. supra note 47, at 124-26.
52 Reynolds, op. cit. supra note 50, at 544-51.
53 Poole, op. cit. supra note 47, at 129-30.
54 Id. at 127-28.
55 Id. at 135.
55 Id. at 129-30.
57 Ibid.
55 Poole, op. cit. supra note 47, at 129-31.
59 Id. at 117-31.
99 Model Penal Code 4 2.07 (1962); Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility,
36 Yale L.J. 827, 837 (1927); Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder Democracy,
4 W. Res. L. Rev. 5 (1952).
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exercising some form of control over the actions of the corporate manage-
ment, that they are able to discover wrongdoing within the corporation and
that the law will aid them in their attempts to correct it, Are these assump-
tions correct?
The first point to be considered is the control which shareholders ac-
tually exercise over corporate affairs. Unquestionably, in any closely held
corporation, the stockholders exercise a great deal of control over the affairs
and policies of the corporation and are usually substantially represented on
the board of directors or in management itself. Under these circumstances,
wrongdoing by the management or upper echelon employees would have an
immediate and radical effect if it were to cost the corporation money. Criminal
activity may also be internally proscribed to a large degree in these corpora-
tions by the close connection between ownership and management and the
consequent immediate supervision stockholders have over corporate affairs.
In these situations, then, a fine is an appropriate remedy both to prevent
crime and to punish the culpable parties when it has occurred. If the stock-
holders wish to avoid financial loss they need simply scrutinize corporate
activities with a more attentive eye.
The large, non-closely held company has a different nature. Although
these are a minority of the total number of corporations, they represent the
vast majority of corporate wealth and are economically the most significant."
It may be questioned whether the simple precepts which apparently work so
well in controlling the behavior of their smaller brethren will do the same for
them. The Berle and Means study, conducted in 1932, 62 classed only thirty-
four per cent of the two hundred largest corporations in America as being
controlled through ownership 6 3
 Subsequent studies, although disagreeing on
particular percentage points, have substantially borne out this conclusion."
The study states:
Frequently ... ownership is so widely scattered that working con-
trol can be maintained with but a minority interest. Separation
becomes complete when not even a substantial minority interest
exists, as in the . American Telephone and Telegraph Company.
Under such conditions control may be held by the directors or titular
managers who can employ the proxy machinery to become a self .
perpetuating body, even though as a group, they own but a small
fraction of the stock outstanding.
A large body of security holders has been created who exercise
virtually no control over the wealth which they or their predecessors
in interest have contributed to the enterprise.°
In a later study60
 Berle states:
61 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 18-46 (1932).
62 Ibid.
Id. at 94, 115.
64 The Distribution of Ownership in the Two Hundred Largest Non-Financial
Corporations (TNEC Monograph No. 29).
05 Berle, supra note 62, at 5.
66 Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society (Pamphlet printed for the Fund
for the Republic 1958).
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For practical purposes . . . the control or power element in most
large corporations rests in its group of directors and it is autono-
mous—or autonomous if taken together with a control bloc. And
inheritance-tax distribution of stock being what it is, the trend is
increasingly to management autonomy. This is a self perpetuating
oligarchy."
If this is the case in the large corporations, then the ability of the stock-
holder to either participate in the affairs of the corporation for the purpose
of preventing criminal activity or to correct it afterwards is quite limited.
There is, of course, the possibility of a stockholders' derivative suit against
the offending officers or directors. Although this remedy is legally available,
various procedural devices severely limit its utilization. The most prominent
of these is the security for expense statutes which exist in many states. The
New York Business Corporation Law, for example, provides that, unless the
stockholder owns five per cent of the total stock or his stock is of the value
of fifty thousand dollars or more, he may be required by the corporation to
give security to the corporation for the expenses of defending the action."
The effect of such a statute has been so drastic as to cause one commentator
to conclude: "Security for expense statutes have sanctioned the virtual elimi-
nation of the stockholder's suit, heretofore the principal device , for intra-
corporate control of large corporations.""
Thus, we find the stockholders are apparently not in the same position
in these large corporations as they were in the smaller or more closely held
ones. On this basis, it would seem that a fine, falling as it does on the stock-
holders, would in no way prevent corporate criminal activity and would, in
fact, punish the parties who are least culpable. Professor Ballantine suggests
that the shareholders are merely treated as convenient hostages," and this
analysis, in large, loosely held companies, seems very close to the truth. It
has, of course, been argued, that responsibility in the modern corporation
is so diffused that it would be virtually impossible to fix personal responsi-
bility for the corporate crime." This still would leave us with the incon-
gruous result that when we are unable to detect the guilty, we must punish the
innocent. As aptly stated earlier, 72
 the object of the criminal law is preven-
tion, not punishment—if the law were entirely sucessful there would be
no one to punish."
67 Id. at 10-12.
68 New York Business Corporation Law § 627.
68 Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 476 (1950).
78 Ballantine, Corporations 280 ( . 1946).
71 Comment, Criminal Prosecutions for ViOlations of the Sherman Act: In Search of
a Policy, 48 Geo. L.J. 530, 540 (1960).
72 Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
73 Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 27 (1957).
Professor Mueller states in commenting upon the American Law Institute, 33rd Annual
Meeting, Proceedings, supra note 30,
Other statements are far less positive, e.g., "affirmative considerations . . . tend
to justify the recognition of corporate criminal liability for the commission
of . . regulatory offenses"; and "the great mass of legislation calling for
corporate criminal liability suggests a widespread belief on the part of legis-
lators that such liability is necessary to effect regulatory policy." "It is not
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The remedy of dissolution, codified in the Model Penal Code, 74 offers
certain advantages—the fact that the use of the remedy is contingent on the
public interest precludes its use in the case of a large company (assuming
dissolution would even be considered in such an instance) and in a smaller
one it could effectively curtail the illegal activities, particularly if the dis-
solution order is coupled with an injunction forbidding the parties from
forming another company for the same purpose.
Other suggestions include the involuntary dismissal of the major
officers and board of directors of a convicted corporation—necessitating a
complete change in management. This would only be effective if coupled with
an injunction, forbidding the parties in question from ever holding an office
of trust or profit under the corporation or a subsidiary. In conclusion then,
the doctrine of corporate criminal liability seems to have little justification in
either logic or legal history. Its only justification would seem to be in its
practical application and even this is apparently in doubt. Formed as a
weapon against large complex business organizations its usefulness would
appear to be outlived and the area should be reexamined by legislatures and
courts, and at least the harsher aspects of the doctrine repealed.
JOHN M. TOBIN
PHILIP H GRANDCHAMP
dear just what conclusions are to be drawn from the cited cases." "It would
be hoped," the subject reporter finally said, "that more could be pointed to
in justification of placing the pecuniary burdens of criminal fines on the innocent
than the difficulties of proving the guilt of the culpable individual." This, I
respectfully submit, is not the ground upon which to perpetuate and enlarge
corporate criminal liability I
74 Model Penal Code 4 6.04 (1962).
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